Lex Rex [Law Is King, or The Law & The Prince] (1644)
General Results of the Former Doctrine, in Some Few Corollaries, or Straying Questions, Fallen off the Roadway, Answered Briefly
Quest. 1. — Whether all governments be but broken governments and deviations from monarchy.
Ans. —1. It is denied: there is no less somewhat of God’s authority in government by many, or some of the choicest of the people, than in monarchy; nor can we judge any ordinance of man unlawful, for we are to be subject to all for the Lord’s sake. (1 Pet. 2:13; Tit. 3:1; 1 Tim. 2:1-3.) 2. Though monarchy should seem the rule of all other governments, in regard of resemblance of the Supreme Monarch of all, yet it is not the moral rule from which, if other governments shall err, they are to be judged sinful deviations.
Quest. 2. — Whether royalty is an immediate issue and spring of nature.
Ans. — No; for a man, fallen in sin, knowing naturally he has need of a law and a government, could have, by reason, devised governors, one or more; and the supervenient institution of God, coming upon this ordinance, does more fully assure us, that God, for man’s good, has appointed governors; but, if we consult with nature, many judges and governors, to fallen nature, seem nearer of blood to nature than one only; for two, because of man’s weakness, are better than one. Now, nature seems to me not to teach that only one sinful man should be the sole and only ruler of a whole kingdom; God, in his word, ever joined with the supreme ruler many rulers, who, as touching the essence of a judge, (which is, to rule for God,) were all equally judges: some reserved acts, or a longer cubit of power in regard of extent, being due to the king.
Quest. 3. — Whether magistrates, as magistrates, be natural.
Ans. — Nature is considered as whole and sinless, or as fallen and broken. In the former consideration, that man should stand in need of some one to compel him with the sword to do his duty, and not oppress, was no more natural to man than to stand in need of lictors and hangmen, or physicians for the body, which in this state was not in a capacity of sickness or death; and so government by parents and husbands was only natural in the latter consideration. Magistrates, as magistrates, are two ways considered, — 1. According to the knowledge of such an ordinance; 2. According to the actual erection of the practice of the office of magistrates. In the former notion, I humbly conceive, that by nature’s light, man now fallen and broken, even under all the fractions of the powers and faculties of the soul, does know, that promises of reward, fear of punishment, and the co-active power of the sword, as Plato said, are natural means to more us, and wings to promote obedience and to do our duty; and that government by magistrates is natural. But, in the second relation, it is hard to determine that kings, rather than other governors, are more natural.
Quest. 4. — Whether nature has determined that there should be one supreme ruler, a king, or many rulers, in a free community.
Ans. — It is denied.
Quest. 5. — Whether every free commonwealth has not in it a supremacy of majesty, which it may formally place in one or many.
Ans. — It is affirmed.
Quest 6. — Whether absolute and unlimited power of royalty be a ray and beam of divine majesty immediately derived from God?
Ans. — Not at all. Such a creature is not in the world of God’s creation. Royalists and flatterers of kings are parents to this prodigious birth. There is no shadow of power to do ill in God. An absolute power is essentially a power to do without or above law, and a power to do ill, to destroy; and so it cannot come from God as a moral power by institution, though it come from God by a flux of permissive providence; but so things unlawful and sinful come from God.
Quest. 7. — Whether the king may in his actions intend his own prerogative and absoluteness.
Ans. — He can neither intend it as his nearest end, nor as his remote end. Not the former, for if he fight and destroy his people for a prerogative, he destroys his people that he may have a power to destroy them, which must be mere tyranny, nor can it be his remote end; for, granting that his supposed absolute prerogative were lawful, he is to refer all lawful power and all his actions to a more noble end, to wit, to the safety and good of the people.
Quest. 8. — Do not they that resist the parliament’s power, resist the parliament; and they that resist the king’s power, resist the king; God has joined king and power, who dare separate them?
Ans. — 1. If the parliament abuse their power, we may resist their abused power, and not their power parliamentary. Mr. Bridges does well distinguish (in his Annotations on the “Loyal Convert”) between the king’s power, and the king’s will, 2. The resisters do not separate king and power, but the king himself does separate his lawful power from his will, if he work and act tyranny out of this principle, will, passion, lust; not out of the royal principle of kingly power. So far we may resist the one, and not the other.
Quest. 9. — Why, if God might work a miracle in the three children’s resistance active, why does he evidence omnipotence in the passive obedience of these witnesses? The kingdom of Judah was Christ’s birthright, as man and David’s son. Why did he not, by legions of men and angels, rather vindicate his own flesh and blood, than triumph by non-resistance, and the omnipotence of glory to shine in his mere suffering?
Ans. — Who art thou that disputest with God? He that kills with the jaw-bone of an ass, thousands, and he that destroyed the numberless Midianites by only three hundred, should no more put the three children to an unlawful act in the one, if they had by three men killed Nebuchadnezzar and all his subjects, than in the other. But nothing is said against us in a sophism a non causa pro causa; except it be proved, God would neither deliver his three children, nor Christ from death, and the Jews from bondage, by miraculous resistance, because resistance is unlawful. And if patient suffering is lawful, therefore, is resistance unlawful? It is a poor consequent, and a begging of the question: both must be lawful to us; and so we hold, of ten lawful means, fit to compass God’s blessed end, he may choose one and let go nine. Shall any infer, therefore, these other nine means are unlawful, because God chose a mean different from those nine, and refused them? So may I answer by retortion. The three hundred sinned in resisting Midian, and defeating them. Why? Because it should be more honor to God, if they had, by suffering patiently the sword of Midian, glorified God in martyrdom. So Christ and the apostles, who could have wrought miracles, might have wrought reformation by the sword, and destroyed kings and emperors, the opposers of the Lamb; and they did reform by suffering; therefore, the sword is unlawful in reformation. It follows not. The mean Christ used, is lawful; therefore, all other means that he used not, are unlawful. It is vain logic.
Quest. 10. — Whether the coronation of a king is any other thing but a ceremony.
Ans. — In the coronation there is, and may be, the ceremony of a shout and an acclamation, and the placing of a scepter in his right hand who is made king, and the like; but the coronation, in concreto, according to the substance of the act, is no ceremony, nor any accidental ingredient in the constitution of a king. 1. Because Israel should have performed a mere ceremonial action on Saul when they made him king, which we cannot say; for as the people’s act of coronation is distinctive, so is it constitutive: it distinguished Saul from all Israel, and did constitute him in a new relation, that he was changed from no king to be a king. 2. The people cannot, by a ceremony, make a king; they must really put some honor on him, that was not put on him before. Now this ceremony, which royalists do fancy coronation to be, is only symbolical and declarative, not really dative. It places nothing in the king.
Quest. 11. — Whether subjects may limit the power that they gave not to the king, it being the immediate result (without intervening of law or any act of man) issuing from God only.
Ans. — 1. Though we should allow (which in reason we cannot grant) that royal power were a result of the immediate bounty of God, without any act of man, yet it may be limited by men, that it over-swell not its banks. Though God immediately make Peter an apostle, without any act of men, yet Paul, by a sharp rebuke, (Gal. 2) curbs and limits his power, that he abuse it not to Judaising. Royalists deny not, but they teach, that the eighty priests that restrained Uzziah’s power “from burning incense to the Lord,” gave no royal power to Uzziah. Do not subjects, by flight, lay restraint upon a king’s power, that he kill not the subjects without cause? yet they teach that subjects gave no power to the king. Certainly this is a proof of the immediate power of the King of kings, that none can fly from his pursuing hand, (Psal. 139:1-3; Amos 9:1-4,) whereas men may fly from earthly kings. Nebuchadnezzar, as royalists teach, might justly conquer some kingdoms, for conquest is a just title to the crown, say they. Now, the conqueror then justly not only limits the royal power of the conquered king, but wholly removes his royalty and unkings him; yet, we know, the conqueror gave no royal power to the conquered king. Joshua and David took away royal power which they never gave, and therefore this is no good reason, — the people gave not to the king royal power, therefore they could not lawfully limit it and take it away.
2. We cannot admit that God gives royal power immediately, without the intervention of any act of law; for it is an act of law, that (Deut. 17) the people chooses such a king, not such a king; that the people, by a legal covenant, make Saul, David, and Joash, kings, and that God exercises any political action of making a king over such subjects, upon such a condition, is absurd and inconceivable; for how can God make Saul and David kings of Israel upon this political and legal condition, that they rule in justice and judgment, but there must intervene a political action? and so they are not made kings immediately. If God feed Moses by bread and manna, the Lord’s act of feeding is mediate, by the mediation of second causes; if he feed Moses forty days without eating any thing, the act of feeding is immediate; if God made David king, as he made him a prophet, I should think God immediately made him king; for God asked consent of no man, of no people, no, not of David himself, before he infused in him the spirit of prophecy; but he made him formally king, by the political and legal covenant between him and the people. I shall not think that a covenant and oath of God is a ceremony, especially a law-covenant, or a political pact between David and the people, the contents whereof behooved to be de materia gravi et onerosa, concerning a great part of obedience to the filth commandment of God’s moral law, the duties moral concerning religion, and mercy, and justice, to be performed reciprocally between king and people. Oaths, I hope, are more than ceremonies.
Quest. 12. — Whether or no the commonwealth is not ever a pupil, never growing to age, as a minor under nonage does come not to need a tutor, but the commonwealth being still in need of a tutor, a governor, or king, must always be a tutor, and so the kingdom can never come to that condition as to accuse the king, it always being minor.
Ans. — 1. Then can they never accuse inferior judges, for a kingdom is perpetually in such a nonage, as it cannot want them, when sometimes it wants a king. 2. Can the commonwealth, under democracy and aristocracy, being perpetually under nonage, ever then quarrel at these governments and never seek a king? By this reason they cannot. 3. The king, in all respects, is not a tutor — every comparison in something bears a leg; for the commonwealth, in their own persons, do choose a king, complain of a king, and resist an Uzziah, and tie their elective prince to a law. A pupil cannot choose his tutor, either his dying father, or the living law does that service for him; he cannot resist his tutor, he cannot tie his tutor to a law, nor limit him, when first he chooses him. Pupillo non licet postulare tutorem suspecti, quamdiu sub tutela est, et manet impubes. (I. Pietatis 6, in sin. C. de susp. Tutor. l. impuberem. 7, and sect, impuberes. Just. eod).
Quest. 13. Whether or no subjects are more obnoxious to a king than clients to patrons, and servants to masters, because the patron cannot be the client’s judge, but some superior magistrate must judge both, and the slave had no refuge against his master, but only flight; and the king does confer infinite greater benefits on the subjects, than the master does on the slave, because he exposes his life, pleasure, ease, credit, and all for the safety of his subjects.1
Ans. — 1. It is denied, for to draw the case to fathers and lords, in respect of children and vassals, the reason why sons, clients, vassals, can neither formally judge, nor judicially punish, fathers, patrons, lords, and masters, though never so tyrannous, is a moral impotency, or a political incongruity, because these relations of patron and client, fathers and children, are supposed to be in a community, in which are rulers and judges above the father and son, the patron and the client; but there is no physical incongruity that the politic inferior punish the superior, if we suppose there were no judges on the earth, and no relation but patron and client; and, because, for the father to destroy the children, is a troubling of the harmony of nature; and the highest degree of violence, therefore one violence of self-defense, and that most just, though contrary to nature, must be a remedy against another violence; but in a kingdom there is no political ruler above both king and people, and therefore, though nature have not formally appointed the political relation of a king rather than many governors and subjects, yet has nature appointed a court and tribunal of necessity, in which the people may, by innocent violence, repress the unjust violence of an injuring prince, so as the people injured in the matter of self-defense may be their own judge.
2. I wonder that any should teach, That oppressed slaves had of old no refuge against the tyranny of masters, but only flight; for, (1.) The law expressly says that they might not only fly but also change masters, which we all know was a great damage to the master, to whom the servant was as good as money in the purse.2 (2.) I have demonstrated before, by the law of nature, and out of diverse learned jurists, that all inferiors may defend themselves by opposing violence against unjust violence; to say nothing that unanswerably I have proved that the kingdom is superior to the king.
3. It is true, Qui plus dat, plus obligat, as the Scripture says, (Luke 7,) He that gives a greater benefit lays a foundation of a greater obligation. But, 1. If benefit be compared with benefit, it is disputable if a king give a greater benefit than an earthly father, to whom, under God, the son is debtor for life and being, if we regard the compensation of eminency of honor and riches, that the people puts upon the king; but I utterly deny that a power to act tyrannous acts, is any benefit or obligation, that the people in reason can lay upon their prince, as a compensation or hire for his great pains he takes in his royal watchtower. I judge it no benefit, but a great hurt, damage, and an ill of nature, both to king and people, that the people should give to their prince any power to destroy themselves, and therefore that people do reverence and honor the prince most, who lay strongest chains and iron fetters on him, that he cannot tyrannise.
Quest. 14. — But are not subjects more subject to their prince, (seeing the subjection is natural, as we see bees and cranes,) to obey him, than servants to their Lord?3 (C. in Apib. 7, 9, 1, ex Hiero. 4, ad Rustic. Monach. Plin. n. 17.) For jurists teach, that servitude is beside or against nature, (l. 5, de stat. homi. sect. 2, just, et jur. pers. c. 3, sect. et sicut Nov. 89, quib. med. nat. eff. sui.)
Ans. — There is no question, in active subjection to princes and fathers commanding in the Lord, we shall grant as high a measure as you desire. But the question is, if either active subjection to ill and unjust mandates, or passive subjection to penal inflictions of tyranny and abused power, be natural or most natural; or if subjects do renounce natural subjection to their prince, when they oppose violence to unjust violence. This is to beg the question. And for the commonwealth of bees and cranes, and crown and scepter amongst them, give me leave to doubt of it. To be subject to kings, is a divine moral law of God; but not properly natural to be subject to co-action of the sword. Government and subjection to parents, is natural; but that a king is juris natureae strictim, I must crave leave to doubt. I hold him to be a divine moral ordinance, to which, in conscience, we are to submit in the Lord.
Quest. 15. — Whether king Uzziah was dethroned by the people?
Ans. — Though we should say he was not formally unkinged and dethroned, yet if the royal power consist in an indivisible point, as some royalists say, and if Uzziah was removed to a private house, and could not reign, being a leper; certainly much royal power was taken from. It is true, Arnisaeus says,4 he neither could be compelled to resign his power, nor was he compelled to resign his royal authority; but he willingly resigned actual government, and remained king, as tutors and curators are put upon kings that are mad or stupid, and children, who yet govern all by the authority of lawful kings. But that Uzziah did not denude himself of the royal power voluntarily, is clear. The reason (2 Chron. 26:21) why he dwelt in a house apart, and did not actually reign, is, because he was a leper; for, “He was cut off (says the text) from the house of the Lord; and Jotham, his son, was over the king’s house, judging the people of the land.” Whereby it is clear, by the express Law of God, he being a leper, and so not by law to enter into the congregation, he was cut off from the house of the Lord; and he being passive, is said to be cut off from the Lord’s house. Whether, then, Uzziah turned necessity to a virtue, I know not: it is evident, that God’s law removed the actual exercise of his power. If we obtain this, which God’s word does give us, we have enough for our purpose, though Uzziah kept the naked title of a king, as indeed he took but up room in the catalogue of kings. Now, if by law he was cut off from actual governing, whether he was willing or not willing to denude himself of reigning, is all one.
And to say, that furious men, idiots, stupid men, and children, who must do all royal acts by curators and tutors, are kings jure, with correction, is petitio principii; for then has God infused immediately from heaven (as royalists teach us) a royal power to govern a kingdom, on those who are as capable of royalty as blocks. I conceive that the Lord (Deut. 17:14-17) commands the people to make no blocks kings; and that the Lord has not done that himself in a binding law to us, which we have no commandment from him to do. I conceive that God made Josiah and Joash kings typical, and in destination, for his promise sake to David, while they were children, as well as he made them kings; but not actu completo ratione officii, to be a rule to us now, to make a child of six years of age a king by office. I conceive children are to us only kings in destination and appointment; and for idiots and fools, I shall not believe (let royalists break their faith upon so rocky and stony a point, at their pleasure) that God has made them governors of others, by royal office, who can scarce number their own fingers; or that God ties a people to acknowledge stupid blocks for royal governors of a kingdom, who cannot govern themselves.
But far be it from me to argue with Bellarmine, (de pœnit. l. 3, c. 2,) from Uzziah’s bodily leprosy to infer that any prince who is spiritually leprous and turned heretical, is presently to be dethroned, Nothing can dethrone a king but such tyranny as is inconsistent with his royal office. Nor dare I infer that kings, now a-days, may be removed from actual government for one single transgression. It is true, eighty priests, and the whole kingdom, so serving king Uzziah (their motives, I know, were divine) proves well that the subjects may punish the transgression of God’s express law in the king, in some cases even to remove him from the throne; but as from God’s commanding to stone the man that gathered sticks on the Sabbath-day, we cannot infer that Sabbath-breakers are now to be punished with death; yet we may well argue, Sabbath-breakers may be punished, and Sabbath-breakers are not unpunishable, and above all law; so may we argue here, Uzziah, though a king, was punished; therefore kings are punishable by subjects.
Quest. 16. — Whether or no, as the denial of active obedience in things unlawful is not dishonorable to the king, as king, he being obliged to command in the Lord only, so the denial of passive subjection to the king using unjust violence, be also no dishonoring of the king.
Ans. — As the king is under God’s law both in commanding and in exacting active obedience, so is he under the same regulating law of God, in punishing or demanding of us passive subjection, and as he may not command what he will, but what the King of kings warrants him to command, so may he not punish as he will, but by warrant also of the Supreme Judge of all the earth; and therefore it is not dishonorable to the majesty of the ruler, that we deny passive subjection to him when he punishes beside his warrant, more than it is against his majesty and honor that we deny active obedience when he commands illegally; else I see not how it is lawful to fly from a tyrannous king, as Elias, Christ, and other of the witnesses of our Lord have done; and, therefore, what royalists say here is a great untruth, namely, that in things lawful we must be subject actively, — in things unlawful, passively. For as we are in things lawful to be subject actively, so there is no duty in point of conscience, laying on us to be subject passively, because I may lawfully fly, and so lawfully deny passive subjection to the king’s will, punishing unjustly.
Quest. 17. — Whether the prince may make away any part of his dominions, as an island, or a kingdom, for the safety of the whole kingdoms he has; as if goods be like to sink an over-burdened ship, the seamen cast away a part of the goods in the sea, to save the lives of the whole passengers; and if three thousand passengers being in one ship, and the ship in a storm like to be lost, it would seem that a thousand may be cast over board, to save the lives of the whole passengers.
Ans. — The kingdom being not the king’s proper heritage, it would seem he cannot make away any part of his kingdom to save the whole, without the express consent of that part, though they be made away to save the whole. In things of this kind, men are not as the commodities of merchants, nor is the case alike; as when one thousand, of three thousand, are to be cast into the sea to save all the rest, and that either by common consent, or by lots, or some other way; for it is one thing, when destruction is evidently inevitable, as in the casting so many men into the sea to save the whole and many passengers, and when a king for peace, or for help from another king, makes away part of his dominion. The Lord is here to be waited on in his good providence, and events are to be committed to him; but far less, can it be imaginably lawful for a king to make away a part of his dominions without their consent, that he may have help from a foreign prince to destroy the rest: this were to make merchandise of the lives of men.5
Quest. 18. — Whether or no the convening of the subjects, without the king’s will, be unlawful.
Ans. — The convention of men, of itself, is an indifferent thing, and takes its specification from its causes, and manner of convening, though some convention of the subjects without the king, be forbidden; yet ratio legis est anima legis, the reason and intent of the law, is the soul of the law. Convention of the subjects, in a tumultuary way, for a seditious end, to make war without warrant of law, is forbidden; but not when religion, laws, liberties, invasion of foreign enemies, necessitates the subjects to convene, though the king and ordinary judicatures, going a corrupt way to pervert judgment, shall refuse to consent to their conventions. Upon which ground, no convention of tables at Edinburgh, or any other place, (an. 1637, 1638, 1639,) can be judged there unlawful; for if these be unlawful, because they are conventions of the leagues, without express act of parliament, then the convention of the leagues to quench a house on fire, and the convention of a country to pursue a wolf entered in the land to destroy women and children, which are warranted by the law of nature, should be lawless, or against acts of parliament.
Quest. 19. — Whether the subjects be obliged to pay the debts of the king.
Ans. — These debts which the king contracts as king, in throno regali, the people are to pay. For the law of nature and the divine law does prove, that to every servant and minister wages is due. (Rom. 13:5-6, compared with verse 4, and 1 Cor. 9:9-12; 1 Tim. 5:18.) If the prince be taken in a war, for the defense of the people, it is just that he be redeemed by them: so the law says, (tit. F. et C. de negotiis gestis, et F. et C. Manda.) But, Ferdinandus Vasquez (illust. quest. l. 1, c. 7, n. 6, Vicesimo tertio apparet, etc.) says, if the prince was not doing the business of the public, and did make war without advice and consent of the people, then are they not to redeem him. Now certain it is, when the king raises war, and says, “God do so to me and mine, if I intend any thing but peace,” yet makes war not only against his oath, but also without consent of the parliament, and a parliament at that time convocated by his own royal writ, and not raised, and dissolved at all, but still sitting formally a parliament; if he borrow money from his own subjects, and from foreign princes, to raise war against his subjects and parliament, then the people are not obliged to pay his debts,
- 1st. Because they are obliged to the king only as a king, and not as an enemy; but in so raising war he cannot be considered as a king.
- 2nd. Though if the people agree with him, and still acknowledge him king; it is impossible, physice, he can be their king, and they not pay his debts; yet they sin not, but may, ex decentia, non ex debito legali, pay his debts, yet are they not obliged by any law of God or man to pay his debts.
But though it be true, by all law the king is obliged to pay his debt, (except we say, that all the people’s goods are the king’s: a compendious way, I confess, to pay all that any voluptuous Heliogabolus shall contract,) yet it may easily be proved, that what his subjects and foreign princes lent him to the raising of an unjust war are not properly debts, but expenses unjustly given out under the reduplication of formal enemies to the country, and so not payable by the subjects; and this is evident by law, because one may give most unjustly monies to his neighbor, under the notion of loan, which yet has nothing of the essence of loan and debt, but is mere delapidation, and cannot properly be debt by God’s law; for the law regulates a man in borrowing and lending, as in other politic actions. If I, out of desire of revenge, should lend monies to a robber to buy powder and fuel to burn an innocent city, or to buy armor to kill innocent men, I deny that that is legally debt. I dispute not whether A. B., borrowing money formally, that thereby he may waste it on debauchery, shall be obliged to repay it to C. D. under the reduplication of debt; or if the borrower be obliged to pay what the lender has unjustly lent. I dare not pray to God that all our king’s debts may be paid; I have scarce faith so to do.
Quest. 20. — Whether subsidies be due to the king as king.
Ans. — There is a twofold subsidy; one debitum, of debt; another, charitativum, by way of charity. A subsidy of debt is rather the kingdom’s due for their necessity than the king’s due, as a part of his rent. We read of customs due to the king as king, and for conscience sake, (Rom. 13:5-6,) never of a subsidy or taxation to the kings of Israel and Judah, at any convention of the states. Augustus Caesar’s taxing of all the world (Luke 2) for the maintenance of wars, cannot be the proper rent of Augustus, as emperor, but the rent of the Roman empire; and it is but the act of a man. Charitative subsidies to the king, of indulgence, because, through bad husbanding of the king’s rents, he has contracted debts, I judge no better than royal and princely begging. Yet lawful they are, as I owe chanty to ray brother, so to my father, so to my politic father the king. See Ferd. Vasq. (illust. quest. l. 1, c. 8) who desires that superiors, under the name of charity, hide not rapine, and cites Cicero, gravely saying, (offic. l.1,) “Nulla generi humano et justitiae major pestis est, quam eorum, quidum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut boni viri esse videantur,” etc.
Quest. 21. — Whether the seas, floods, roadways, castles, ports, public magazine, militia, armor, forts, and strongholds be the king’s.
Ans. — All these may be understood to be the king’s in diverse notions. 1. They are the king’s, quoad custodiam, et publicam possessionem, as a pawn is the man’s in whose hand the pawn is laid down. 2. They are the king’s, quoad jurisdictionem cumulativam, non privativam. The king is to direct, and royally to command, that the castles, forts, ports, strongholds, armor, magazine, militia, be employed for the safety of the kingdom. All the ways, bridges, and public roadways, are the king’s, in so far as he, as a public and royal watchman, is to secure the subject from robbers, and to cognosce of unknown murders, by himself and the inferior judges; yet may not the king employ any of these against the kingdom. 3. They are the kings, as he is king, quoad officialem, et regalem, et publicam proprietatem; for he has a royal and princely propriety to all these, as his own, in so far as he uses them according to law. 4. And thus they are the king’s also, quoad usum, in regard of official use.
But, 1. They are the kingdom’s, quoad fructum, in regard of the effect and fruit. 2. They are the kingdom’s, finaliter, being destinated for the safety and security of the kingdom. 3. They are the kingdom’s, quoad proprietatem propriam, et legalem stricte sumptam, according to the proper and legal propriety; and are not the king’s proper heritage as he is a man: (1.) Because he may not sell these forts, strongholds, ports, magazine, bridges, etc. to a stranger, or a foreign prince. (2.) When the king is dead, and his heirs and royal line interrupted, these all remain proper to the kingdom; yet so as the state cannot, as they are men, make them away, or sell them, more than the king; for no public persons, yea the multitude cannot make away the security, safety, and that which necessarily conduces to the security of the posterity. “The Lord build his own Zion, and appoint salvation for walls and bulwarks!”
1. Arnisaeus de authorit. princip., c. 3, n.. 6.
2. Servi indigne habiti confugiendi ad statuas, et dominum mutandi copiam habent, 1. 2. De bis qui sunt sui. Item, C. de lat. Hered. toll.
3. Arnisaeus de authorit. princip. in popul c. 3, n. 7.
4. Arnisaeus de jure Pontif. Rom. in Regna et Princ. c. 5, n, 30.
5. Ferdinan. Vasquez illust. quest. l. 1, c. 3, n. 8, juri alieno quisquam nec in minima. parte obesse potest. l. id quod nostru. F. de reg. jur. 1. jur. natu. cod. titul. 1.